The Birth of the Federal Employees Pension Plan by Clark, Robert L. et al.
University of Pennsylvania 
ScholarlyCommons 
Wharton Pension Research Council Working 
Papers Wharton Pension Research Council 
2003 
The Birth of the Federal Employees Pension Plan 
Robert L. Clark 
Lee A. Craig 
Jack W. Wilson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
The published version of this Working Paper may be found in the 2003 publication: A History of Public Sector 
Pensions in the United States. 
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/prc_papers/662 
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu. 




The published version of this Working Paper may be found in the 2003 publication: A History of Public 
Sector Pensions in the United States. 
A History of
Public Sector Pensions
in the United States
Robert L. Clark, Lee A. Craig, and Jack W. Wilson
Pension Research Council
The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania
University of Pennsylvania Press
Philadelphia
00front.qxd  2/27/03  9:20 AM  Page iii
Copyright © 2003 The Pension Research Council of the Wharton School of the University of
Pennsylvania 
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper
10  9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1
Published by 
University of Pennsylvania Press
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-4011
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Clark, Robert Louis, 1949-
A history of public sector pensions in the United States, / Robert L. Clark, Lee A. Craig,
Jack W. Wilson.
p. cm.
“Pension Research Council publications.”
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-8122-3714-5 (cloth : alk. paper)
1. United States—Officials and employees—Pensions. 2. Military pensions—United States.
I. Craig, Lee A. (Lee Allan), 1960- II. Wilson, Jack W. III. Title.
JK791.C58 2003
331.25′29135173—dc21 2002043046
00front.qxd  2/27/03  9:20 AM  Page iv
Chapter 9
The Birth of the
Federal Employees
Pension Plan
The previous chapters have presented a detailed history of the development
of military pensions in America. The analysis has focused primarily on
military pensions because of their early development, widespread cover-
age, and unique history. The use of pensions to compensate other public
employees is a more recent development in the United States dating from
the middle of the nineteenth century. Despite this late start relative to the
military, pension coverage for civilian employees in the public sector came
earlier and expanded more rapidly than pension coverage in the private
sector. As the earlier chapters have shown, economic reasons encouraged
the adoption of pensions for military personnel. Many of these reasons
were unique to those workers; however, challenges associated with attract-
ing, retaining, and retiring workers in the nonmilitary public sector are
similar to those facing the military services at least with respect to some fea-
tures. In addition, some of the problems of managing the funds associated
with military pensions, the high variance in annual revenues, and the polit-
ical implications of supporting aged and disabled workers also applied to
civilian public employees. 
Despite some similarities, both the timing and the economics of nonmil-
itary public pension plans differ in some respects from those for military
personnel. The underlying motivation for a pension agreement between
public sector workers and the state is quite similar to that for private sector
agreements. Pensions represent an exchange in which organizations pro-
vide greater lifetime incomes for employees, and employers offer these
higher lifetime incomes based on the expectation that workers will behave
differently when a portion of their compensation is in the form of future
pension beneWts. Chapter 2 provides a detailed explanation of pension eco-
nomics and describes the various incentives imbedded in many pension
plans. In general, pensions can be viewed as components of efWcient con-
tracts that tie the receipt and size of the deferred beneWt to a worker’s
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longevity. Employers proWt from this arrangement through a reduction
in turnover costs and the orderly retirement of older workers. Workers gain
from the increase in their lifetime incomes. Modern pensions offer other
advantages as well. For example, they provide retirement income insurance
and tax shelters for workers (Bodie 1990). Of course, the tax-deferred
nature of pension compensation provided little comfort in an age when
only the highest paid workers were subject to the personal income tax.
Public sector workers were not typically among this group.
By the 1920s, pension plans existed for a wide array of public sector
employees at the state, local, and federal levels even though such plans were
still rare among private workers. Furthermore, in many cases, these plans
were considerably more lucrative than private plans in place at that time
or during the subsequent two decades. This observation is consistent with
a number of studies that Wnd that public sector workers are frequently
“overcompensated” relative to private sector workers, perhaps by as much
as 20 percent (Smith 1976, 1977, 1981; Venti 1987; and Krueger 1988).
Consequently, understanding the issues which are unique to public plans,
including the timing of their creation, is crucial to understanding the role
of these plans in the economics of the public sector. Our analysis focuses
on three characteristics that caused the history of public sector pensions to
diverge from that of private sector pensions: (1) rent seeking by public
employees, (2) patronage versus merit in public sector hiring practices, and
(3) Progressive Era politics.
As with other aspects of the employment contract, the difference in com-
pensation between public and private workers may be due to rent seeking
on the part of public employees. In this context, rent seeking may be
thought of as the pursuit of gain through political lobbying rather than
through productive economic activity in the marketplace. As a component
of total compensation, one could reasonably expect pensions to have been
the object of at least some rent seeking by public sector workers. A share of
these rents may have reXected what is called in a broader context “organi-
zational rents,” which accrue, at least partly, from the costs of monitoring
workers (Aoki 1984). That is to say, because monitoring is costly, the opti-
mal level of shirking is not zero; workers get paid for work they don’t
perform. Although the level of deferred compensation embodied in public
sector pension plans may have contained organizational rents in excess of
those found in the private sector, rent seeking cannot entirely explain the
history of public sector pension plans. While rent seeking alone might yield
greater pension beneWts, several features of these early public sector plans
are consistent with optimal contracting between public workers and the
state. First, the state provided greater pension beneWts and hence higher
lifetime incomes to workers while workers offered some productivity-
enhancing behavior in return, such as lower turnover. In addition, many
plans contained mandatory retirement clauses, and just as predicted in
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Chapter 2, there is evidence that workers also accepted lower wage proWles
in return for their pension plans. In other words, workers were willing to
trade some current income for a retirement beneWt. All these characteris-
tics point to optimal contracting rather than rent seeking.
Another characteristic of the early public sector pension plans involves
the nature of civil service contracts before the rise of merit systems. In the
absence of civil service legislation protecting the tenure of public workers,
elected ofWcials employed patronage as the means of distributing rents
and enforcing the provision of some minimum level of publicly provided
goods. In the United States prior to the late nineteenth century most fed-
eral civil servants were patronage employees. Once government workers
were granted de facto lifetime tenure along with the rigid pay and promo-
tion standards associated with a civil service bureaucracy, administrators
had to develop some other means of distributing rents. Not coincidentally,
the movement from patronage to merit began at roughly the same time as
public sector pensions began to emerge and grow (Johnson and Libecap
1994). Initially, converting patronage jobs to civil service positions sufWced.
The politicians responsible for granting de facto lifetime tenure on whole
classes of public employees could expect to receive a great deal of loyalty
and support in return. However, after roughly a generation of growth in
nonpatronage employment, elected ofWcials discovered that they were in
the so-called “Lazear trap” (Craig 1995). This situation occurs when elderly
workers receive a wage greater than their reservation wage—that is, the
minimum wage required to induce labor force participation. Receiving
compensation in excess of the reservation wage meant that workers would
not retire when their compensation exceeded their productivity. In order
to force the retirement of these workers, public sector employers frequently
adopted mandatory retirement provisions in conjunction with the estab-
lishment of pension plans. As we saw in the previous chapter, the army
and navy both followed this path.
Also, the emergence of public sector pension plans on a large scale coin-
cided with an era of progressive politics in the United States. At all levels of
government, the era of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
was marked by efforts to move toward the welfare state. Although ultimately
this movement would not see much success on a broad scale until the fed-
eral government became involved during the Great Depression (Goldin
and Libecap 1994), the reforms in public sector employment were one part
of the agenda that did achieve some success. Of course, one element of that
particular part of the agenda was the movement from patronage to merit.
This movement had some unanticipated effects on the emergence and
growth of public sector pension plans, but the explicit adoption of pension
plans or “old-age relief” was another part. 
The movement to create public sector pension plans involved more than
just a general improvement in the working conditions of public employees.
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In fact, it was tied to the growth of the welfare state in Europe. Many
American progressives envisioned the nascent European “cradle-to-grave”
programs as the precursor of a better future in the United States. Accord-
ing to progressives, old-age pensions represented the last step before the
“grave” in the Good Society. By the early twentieth century, 32 countries
around the world had some type of old-age pension for their nonmilitary
public employees. The fact that such reactionary regimes as Russia, Spain,
and Austria-Hungary had state pensions gave a great deal of moral weight
to the arguments of U.S. reformers. At a time when progressive politicians
in the United States were calling for universal old-age pensions, it seemed
only natural to create such plans for government workers. Although the
progressives failed in their efforts to provide plans for everyone or even all
workers, they were often successful in providing plans for the workers over
whom they had the most direct inXuence, public sector workers.
Ironically, the creation of public sector pension plans for nonmilitary
workers followed a path from one political unit to another that went in
exactly the opposite direction of the creation of the units themselves.
Congress created states from territories and states created cities. In con-
trast, cities were the Wrst political units to offer pensions, beginning in
1857. The states began to establish pensions for their employees in 1911.
Lagging behind these efforts, the federal government did not adopt a
universal pension plan for civilian employees until 1920. This is not to say
that there were no federal pensions before 1920. Pensions were available
for some retiring civil servants, but Congress created them on a case-by-case
basis. In the year before the federal pension plan went into effect, there
were 1,467 pension granted (912) or annuities increased (555) by special
acts of Congress (U.S. Department of the Interior, 1921). This process was
as inefWcient as it was capricious. With respect to pensions before the act
of 1920, federal workers were reduced to the status of French bureaucrats
during the ancien régime, who received a pension only with the blessing of
their patron. Individual pensions in this period were discretionary and
granted on a case-by-case basis. Ending this system became a key objective
of congressional reforms. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to the
development of a formal pension system for federal employees.
The Creation of Federal Civil Service Pensions
Discussion of federal civil service pensions dated from the late nineteenth
century. The key to the creation of a civil service pension plan was the cre-
ation of a civil service. Prior to the late nineteenth century, federal employ-
ees were essentially patronage employees. With the tremendous growth of
the number of such employees in the nineteenth century, the beneWts of a
patronage system were outweighed by the costs of managing it.1 During the
congressional debates leading up to passage of the Pendleton Act of 1883,
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which created the federal civil service, supporters made references to the
growth of federal government expenditures and employment over the nine-
teenth century. For example, over the century as a whole the number of
post ofWces grew from 906 to 44,848; federal revenues grew from $3 million
to over $400 million; and nonmilitary employment went from 1,000 to
100,000. Indeed, the federal labor force nearly doubled in the 1870s alone
(Johnson and Libecap 1994).
The problems associated with managing that growth took a heavy toll on
the resources of the executive branch. In an environment where every job
was up for grabs as part of the political spoils system, “no single human
being, however great his intelligence, discrimination, industry, endurance,
devotion, even if relieved of every other duty, [could] possibly, unaided,
select and retain in ofWcial station those best Wtted to discharge the many
and varied and delicate functions of the government.”2 The Pendleton Act
was passed at a time when the Republicans controlled both houses of
Congress and the White House. It was passed on votes largely, though not
entirely, along party lines. As the party in power, the Republicans saw the
conversion of federal employment from patronage to “merit” as an oppor-
tunity to gain the lifetime loyalty of an entire cohort of federal workers. In
other words, by converting in a single action patronage jobs to civil service
jobs, the party in power attempted to create lifetime tenure of its patronage
workers. Of course, there proved to be a cloud wrapped around this silver
lining. Once in their civil service jobs, protected from the harshest effects
of the spoils system, federal workers simply did not want to ever give up
their jobs. They would not retire, and thus the conversion from patronage
to civil service sprung the aforementioned Lazear trap. It took less than
one generation before Congress and the executive branch realized what
had happened. In response to this aging of the labor force, the quest for a
federal pension plan began.
A bill providing pensions for nonmilitary employees of the federal
government was introduced in every session of Congress between 1900 and
1920. Representatives of workers’ groups, the executive branch, the United
States Civil Service Commission, and researchers appointed by congres-
sional committees all requested or recommended the adoption of retire-
ment plans for civil service employees. The political dynamics among these
parties was often subtle and complex. There were at least three employee
groups lobbying for a federal pension plan—the postal unions, the U.S.
Civil Service Retirement Commission, and the National Association of
Civil Service Employees. These groups eventually formed the Joint Con-
ference on Retirement, which led the campaign that culminated in the
passage of a civil service pension plan after two decades of congressional
wrangling. Congress Wnally passed the Federal Employees Retirement Act
(FERA) on May 22, 1920, at the outset of the presidential campaign of that
year.
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Both major political parties supported a federal pension plan, though
there was disagreement over the structure of the plan, and within each
party there were major Wgures opposed to the adoption of any civil service
pension plan. Throughout the debate leading up to the passage of the act,
the government’s contribution to the retirement plan proved to be a per-
petual and most contentious issue. Supporters of pensions for federal
employees argued that the act met the needs of three groups: federal work-
ers, the government, and taxpayers. In a speech before the Senate, Thomas
Sterling, FERA’s most tireless defender, summed up the rewards to each
of these groups from the establishment of a civil service pension plan
(Congressional Record 1920). The act’s sponsor in the Senate, Sterling was
a progressive Republican from South Dakota. A former law professor at the
University of South Dakota, Sterling argued persistently that the act would
lead to a more efWcient provision of public goods by simultaneously increas-
ing the lifetime incomes of federal employees and encouraging the dis-
charge of superannuated workers.
Sterling claimed workers would beneWt through higher lifetime incomes;
the government would beneWt from the reduction in turnover of younger
workers and the mandatory retirement of older workers. Finally, he argued
that taxpayers would receive a more efWcient provision of public goods lead-
ing to an increase in their conWdence in the government. In short, Sterling
argued, without exactly using the term, FERA represented an optimal con-
tract in which all contracting parties were better off (Craig 1995). 
One of the key economic aspects of the various proposals was the
promise of higher lifetime incomes associated with the pension plan. Two
important economic issues are related to this promise. The Wrst is that the
promise is implicitly based on what economists today refer to as the
“efWciency wage hypothesis.”3 This theory suggests that in some cases, usu-
ally situations in which monitoring is relatively costly, employers will pay a
wage above the equilibrium or market-clearing wage in order to induce
workers to self-monitor. The idea is that if a worker is paid above his oppor-
tunity cost, which equals the market-clearing wage, then he will monitor
himself to avoid being discharged and having to go back into the labor mar-
ket and receive his opportunity wage, which is below the efWciency wage.
This self-monitoring reduces the likelihood of shirking. The discussion in
the Senate indicates that supporters of FERA maintained a model of public
employment not unlike contemporary theories of efWciency wages. They
argued raising (lifetime) wages would increase productivity through self-
monitoring on the part of federal workers. 
The second important point connected to the notion of higher lifetime
incomes is that workers would only receive the higher (lifetime) wage rela-
tive to a situation in which they retired at some point and received no
pension. Workers who remained on the job rather than retiring with either
no pension or the proposed federal pension would in fact receive a lower
The Birth of the Federal Employees Pension Plan 159
09Chap9.qxd  2/27/03  9:34 AM  Page 159
lifetime income than those who remained, because the pension payment
was less than 100 percent of their pre-retirement earnings. Of course when
they retire they no longer incur the disutility of working.
As a result of receiving the higher efWciency wage, workers do not quit
their current jobs as frequently as they otherwise might; thus turnover rates
are lower, other things equal. A member of the Civil Service Commission
testiWed before the Committee on Civil Service Retrenchment in 1917 that
“A retirement system would give stability to the service, create an induce-
ment to capable men to continue in it, contribute to improved administra-
tion methods, and make possible a standardization of salaries and other
needed reforms.” Treasury Secretary Carter Glass concurred, testifying that
“the efWciency of the [Treasury] Department is retarded for want of a retire-
ment system” (Congressional Record 1920).
When it came to actually steering a pension act through Congress, Ster-
ling faced a more difWcult task in the Senate than did Republican Frederick
Lehlbach, a former Newark, New Jersey prosecutor who was the act’s spon-
sor in the House. Debate was considerably less acrimonious in the House,
and the act ultimately passed in this body with a majority of more than Wve
to one. The election of 1918 had swung the House dramatically to the
Republicans, who picked up 30 seats and maintained a 50-seat majority in
the 66th Congress. In the Senate, the Republican majority was a mere two
seats. But the problems the act encountered in the Senate were only partly
related to the Republicans’ much smaller majority there. This smaller
majority and Senate rules allowed individual senators to play a much larger
role in shaping the debate on the pension bill and ultimately in the passage
of the bill itself.
Opponents of the act countered that while they supported pensions for
federal workers in principle the returns to both the government and the
taxpayer from such a plan did not justify the costs. Among the senators
who had the strongest reservations were Atlee Pomerene, a Democrat
from Ohio, Republican Albert Cummins of Iowa, and Reed Smoot, a Utah
Republican. Pomerene and Cummins were both former chairmen of the
Civil Service Committee, now chaired by Sterling. They felt that the gov-
ernment incurred too large a share of the costs of the plan. “I am not
opposed to a retirement plan,” claimed Pomerene, “but I am opposed to
[Sterling’s] plan, and I think the majority of the Senate will be opposed
to that plan when they realize how tremendous the cost is going to be” (Con-
gressional Record 1920). Pomerene, apparently seeking to mollify federal
workers, claimed time and again that he was a “friend of the civil-service em-
ployee.” This constant reassertion of Pomerene’s amity toward federal
workers led his colleague Kenneth D. McKellar to proclaim, “if [Pomerene]
was the friend of the civil-service employee, then God help the civil-service
employee, because to my notion no man ever fought a measure with more
vigor or success” (Congressional Record 1920). Exchanges such as these
160 Chapter 9
09Chap9.qxd  2/27/03  9:34 AM  Page 160
demonstrate the growing political clout of civil service workers. Die-hard
obstructionists did not want to go on record as being opposed to pensions
for federal workers, while the act’s strongest supporters attempted to reveal
opponents for what they were. Indeed, the Senate debates leading up to the
passage of the act indicate that no senator wanted to go on record as object-
ing to the bill in principle as it circulated through Congress. Those who
objected to establishing a pension did so on one of two grounds. One objec-
tion was to the method in which the plan would be funded. In this debate,
some Senators thought the government’s share should be smaller while
others thought it should be larger. A second objection related to the then
current postwar budgetary situation, which they argued should prohibit
them from undertaking any new Wnancial commitments of the scale such a
plan required.
The issue of mandatory retirement was related to both of these criticisms.
Many appointed ofWcials and federal department heads requested a man-
datory retirement clause. However, a number of senators viewed this as a
particularly budget-busting aspect of the act. In addition, these senators
objected to an early retirement provision, claiming workers in good health
should not be automatically awarded a pension upon reaching a speciWc
number of years in service or a particular age. According to Pomerene, “the
man who wants to retire at 60 or 62 or 65 years of age, if he is in good
health, ought to have retired from the service before he entered it.” Smoot
agreed: “I am not willing, after having paid an employee who has reached
the age of 60 years the salary which the Government would be compelled to
pay him all that time, to allow him to leave the Government service, draw
$720 from the Government, and give all of his energy and service, which
ought to be given to the Government of the United States, to some outside
concern. That is the whole matter in a nutshell” (Congressional Record 1920). 
Taken at face value, Pomerene and Smoot’s criticism of the pension plan
could be interpreted simply as a complaint concerning the generosity of the
plan. However, both were subtle men, and in fact neither had been whole-
hearted supporters of the spirit of the conversion of federal employment to
a purely meritorious status. The key to getting workers to accept a pension
plan that actually induced them to retire or forced them to do so at some
point was to construct a plan that offered a retirement beneWt that exceeded
the workers’ reservation wage4— that is, the lowest wage a worker would
accept to supply his or her labor in the market. If, as Smoot and Pomerene
demanded, the pension beneWt were not generous enough to induce work-
ers to retire or at least compensate them adequately after mandatory re-
tirement, then the workers would not have embraced the plan, and it is
possible that they might have rejected it outright through their workers’
associations. Since collective bargaining was not an option for federal work-
ers, it is impossible to say what the ultimate outcome of this dispute would
have been.
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Interestingly, the groups representing federal workers did not object to
the mandatory retirement clause in the act. There are two implications
of this observation. First, they may not have objected because the “early”
retirement provisions were so lucrative that for the majority of their work-
ers the mandatory provision was moot. In other words, the typical worker
would have gladly taken his pension before mandatory retirement became
an issue. The second implication is that, even for those workers who might
have ultimately faced mandatory retirement, the pension payment over the
remainder of their lives plus the absence of any disutility associated with
work was enough to compensate them for the loss of income they incurred
by being forced to retire.
The claim by the opposition senators that they supported a pension plan
in principle while they spent years obstructing the passage of legislation
that would establish a plan reXected the growing power of federal employ-
ees as a lobbying group. The lobbying efforts by federal employees were
advanced by a number of their own worker associations, which had risen
in number, size, and outspokenness since the shift from patronage to a
merit-based civil service had begun forty years earlier. This shift originated
with the Pendleton Act. By 1919, the year before the pension plan was cre-
ated, 70 percent of federal civilian employees “were classiWed” as nonpa-
tronage workers (Johnson and Libecap 1994). Since replacing patronage
with a civil bureaucracy granted de facto lifetime tenure to a large class of
federal employees, it also solidiWed them as an interest group. 
Senate Republicans complained bitterly about some of the lobbying tac-
tics of federal employees in general and their lobbying groups in particular.
The Xirtation of federal worker organizations with the American Feder-
ation of Labor received the harshest criticism. “Federal employees should
be prohibited from allying themselves in any way whatever with powerful
inXuences outside of the Government,” declared Henry L. Myers during
debate over the act. “I think they should be prevented from forming any
allegiance or alliance with any inXuence other than that of the Govern-
ment for which they work and to which their supreme duty is owing” (Congres-
sional Record 1920). 
The conversion from patronage to civil service created a unique oppor-
tunity for elected ofWcials to capture the political allegiance of these work-
ers, which was one of the main reasons the Republicans had moved to a
merit-based civil service in the late nineteenth century, but the government
still faced the question of what to do with the workers who would not leave
the job upon reaching old age. The growth of civil service employment
and the related employment and tenure rules was not a seamless transition
from the patronage system. Lifetime tenure for federal employees pro-
duced a proliferation of superannuated employees; again, the Lazear trap
comes into play. The aging of the labor force resulted in an increase in the
costs of providing goods and services. Many of the directors of federal
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departments practically begged Congress to provide pensions that included
a mandatory retirement provision for these employees. Testimony during
numerous hearings held between 1900 and 1920 on pensions for federal
employees documented the complaints of federal administrators concern-
ing the accumulation of elderly workers in the higher civil service grades
(U.S. House of Representatives 1912; U.S. Senate 1919). The problem was
that in the absence of a pension plan, which might or might not be accom-
panied by mandatory retirement, there was little or no incentive for a civil
servant to retire. 
To understand this issue more clearly, consider a typical civil servant
around 1920. Suppose that she earned $1,200 a year. It would not require
an annual pension payment of this magnitude to get her to retire voluntar-
ily. Assume the worker incurs some disutility from engaging in employ-
ment—that is, ceteris paribus, she would rather be doing something else, such
as gardening, reading, or playing with a grandchild. The pension payment
required to induce retirement would be a payment that just equals the dif-
ference between the wage and the value the worker places on these other
activities. In other words, what is the lowest amount the government would
have to pay to get the worker to play with her grandchild rather than go to
work and collect her full salary? For many if not most workers, there is some
“replacement rate” that is less than 100 percent, perhaps substantially less
than that amount, that would induce the worker to retire before reaching a
mandatory retirement age. For other workers, however, either the disutility
of work is so low or their capacity to shirk is so high that they will not accept
the pension and choose to remain on the job indeWnitely. Mandatory retire-
ment was the destiny of those workers.
Ultimately, Sterling carried the day in the Senate, and the act passed. It
did include a mandatory retirement clause. Among the key features of the
original act of 1920 were the following:
1. All classiWed civil service employees qualiWed for a pension after reach-
ing age 70 and rendering at least 15 years of service. Mechanics, letter
carriers, and post ofWce clerks were eligible for a pension after reaching
age 65, and railway clerks qualiWed at age 62.
2. The ages at which employees qualiWed were also mandatory retirement
ages. An employee could, however, be retained for two years beyond the
mandatory age if his department head and the head of the Civil Service
Commission approved.
3. All eligible employees were required to contribute 2.5 percent of their
salaries or wages toward the payment of pensions.
4. The pension beneWt was determined by the number of years of service.
Class A employees were those who had served 30 or more years. Their
beneWt was 60 percent of their average annual salary during the last
ten years of service. The beneWts were scaled down through Class F
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employees (at least 15 years but less than 18 years of service), who
received 30 percent of their average annual salary during the last ten
years of service.
Although subsequently revised, this plan remains one of the two main
civil service pension plans in the United States (Hustead and Hustead
2001). Comparisons with other public and private pension plans in effect
in 1920 show that, although several cities offered pension plans for at least
some of their employees, and some states provided plans for their teachers,
only one state, Massachusetts, had a civil service retirement plan by 1920.5
Furthermore, there were relatively few private sector plans at the time. The
Massachusetts plan, which is discussed at length in the next chapter, was
offered as a model for the federal plan. In the Massachusetts plan, the state
government paid 50 percent of the pension annuity. Ultimately, the federal
government’s share of the federal employees’ pension plan was greater
than 50 percent. Most contemporary estimates of the share of a federal pen-
sion that would end up being paid by the government fell between two-
thirds and one-half, though they varied from somewhat below this range to
almost 100 percent. This issue generated more controversy than any other
surrounding the bill, as the comments by dissenters such as Pomerene and
Smoot suggest. In fact, the discussions in the Congressional Record concern-
ing the (expected) share paid by the government are enlightening solely for
the amount of confusion they bring to the subject. This confusion was
partly the result of political Xummery and obfuscation, but it also reXected
the absence of actuarial and accounting standards by which the debate
could be constrained. During the 1920s, the federal government’s actual
share was two-thirds according to at least one contemporary scholar of the
issue (Epstein 1928). 
As stated above, pension coverage was relatively rare among private sec-
tor workers at this time. Only around 3 million U.S. workers, or roughly
13 percent of the private, nonfarm labor force, were covered by a pension
plan in 1920. The lack of funding and vesting regulations meant that only
a small proportion of these workers would ever receive a retirement bene-
Wt. Indeed, plans covering more than three-quarters of the total number of
workers with a pension were discontinued during the Wrst four years of
the Depression (Craig and White 1993). Furthermore, the few plans that
remained viable were not as lucrative as the plan for federal civil servants.
Almost no private sector plans paid more than1.5 percent per year of
service of some average of the worker’s salary during the last few years
of service. Few private plans matched the federal plan’s minimum pensions
of $180 (Class F) to $360 (Class A) for comparable years of service.
Not only was the federal plan initially more lucrative compared to private
or state plans, but it was also safer. During the Depression, when many pri-
vate plans were discontinued, suspended, or closed to future employees, the
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federal government made its pensions even more valuable by eliminating
the maximum payment provision of the original plan.
Summary
The federal government provided pensions for its employees before pri-
vate sector Wrms; the federal plan also antedated those of all but one state
government. The federal pension plan was enacted in response to lobbying
by both workers and administrators, and the plan was more lucrative than
most contemporary public or private plans. When many of those other
plans defaulted during the Depression, the federal plan actually became
more valuable. To one degree or another, these features are consistent with
our discussion of the causes and economics of public sector pension plans.
This review of the development of nonmilitary, public sector pension
plans at the federal level in the United States highlights four salient features
of that history.6 First, the timing of the establishment of most of these plans
suggests that, prior to the early twentieth century, either public sector work-
ers were not willing to accept the deferred component of a pension plan as
part of their compensation or public sector employers were not willing to
offer such plans. In fact given the nature of public sector labor markets in
the nineteenth century, it is not surprising that relatively few public employ-
ees were covered by a pension plan. Much of the employment in the public
sector was based on political patronage. Workers could easily Wnd them-
selves out on the street after an election. The uncertainty of employment
meant that workers were not willing to bear the risk of deferring a substan-
tial proportion of their income until retirement.
Second, employers were not willing to offer a pension plan to workers
who were likely to be unable to continue in their positions even if they
so desired. Prior to the formal establishment of a civil service with protec-
tion from the vagaries of the political spoils system, no reason existed for
a pension contract between workers and the state. After the conversion
from patronage to merit, this situation changed dramatically; both employ-
ers and employees saw the advantages associated with pension plans. The
government received mandatory retirement, and probably overall a smaller
lifetime wage payment to workers, at least when compared to their lifetime
wage proWles without mandatory retirement. Workers received retirement
income, which, while less than their wages, was offered without the demand
for work in return. It proved to be a good bargain for both sides. 
Third, in spite of the fact that there was no federal civil service pension
plan before 1920, the plan that ultimately passed was relatively lucrative.
Early on the plan provided beneWts equal to 30–60 percent of earnings
at the time of retirement, and workers could typically retire at “full beneWt”
after 30 years or so of service. The federal plan was never explicitly funded
by anything other than a promise on the part of the Congress to extract
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the tax revenues that would be necessary to meet its share of the pension
contract. 
Finally, the federal employees pension plan became a classic contribu-
tory, deWned beneWt pension plan for all federal civil servants. This turn of
events had two implications for other employers in both the public sector
and the private sector. First, to the extent federal workers valued their pen-
sion plan, it put economic pressure on other employers to offer competi-
tive plans. Second, as the Progressives intended, the federal pension plan
served as a model towards which reformers could point and strive to
achieve in other sectors of the economy. Although they made substantial
progress in expanding pension coverage for American workers in the 1920s,
the Great Depression interrupted that progress, at least in the private sector.
Notes
1. This discussion of the demise of the patronage system owes much to Johnson
and Libecap (1994).
2. From a U.S. Senate report, quoted in Johnson and Libecap (1994).
3. The seminal work on efWciency wages is Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
4. The economics of this issue is slightly more complicated than this discussion
suggests (Craig 1995).
5. See Chapter 10.
6. For a comparison and review of the basic features of the various public sector
pensions plans see Hustead and Mitchell (2001) and the papers in Mitchell and
Hustead (2001).
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